District Public Safety and and police complaint commission

These multi-stakeholder bodies have been assigned the powers to receive complaints of police neglect or excesses, and to direct the head of police to take action within a specified period. However, the merger of PGR and public oversight functions reduces specialization, and therefore both require separate specialist entities. In cases of police excess, these bodies may conduct a fact-finding enquiry themselves and, if finding proof, they may direct the head of police to suspend the delinquent officer and take action under Police Order and Rules. In case the head of police does not take any action, they may report to the provincial police officer or the provincial government for appropriate action.

 

This is apparently an effective mechanism to make the police accountable to public bodies, yet implementation has been extremely weak. The spirit of the new law was to create neutral public bodes, but faulty selection procedures have by and large resulted in many members with strong political affiliations and incentives to enjoy close connections with the local police. These bodies have no original powers. Recent amendments in Police Order have opened the door for direct political interference in Public Safety Commissions. The real purpose of these public bodies to act as an insulator and watch over the police is not being realized. Likewise, if the Commissions do not have solid support of the provincial governments, they may prove like other toothless Police Committees of the past. The Commissions mostly continue to suffer from infrastructure deficiencies and lack of support from vertically and horizontally connected departments/institutions that could otherwise-make them truly functional.

The concept of Public Safety Commissions relies on the constructive and assertive engagement of civil society. However, it appears that the democratic traditions required to engaging citizenry in governance and accountability are not yet crystallized. The Commissions have insufficient staff, inadequate resources, no M & E framework, no training, no rules, and no public awareness! The lack of will across the board to make this mechanism function indicates a strong likelihood that the Commissions may not be fully effective during initial years. Political will is needed to improve the quality and performance of members of these Commissions with the passage of time