External Grievance Redress Mechanisms
The Police Rules, 1934
provided a role and power to the District
Magistrate (DM) and Subordinate Magistracy
for accountability of the police. Sections
1.15, 1.16 and 1.17 empowered the DM as head
of criminal administration, making the
police an instrument for the maintenance of
public order. Although afforded powers to
inspect police stations, the DM was
forbidden to interfere in internal
administration and discipline of the force.
Under these sections, the DM could direct
the Superintendent of Police (SP) to inquire
against a police officer found negligent of
his duties and guilty of misconduct that
could affect the performance of police. He
was also empowered to approve postings of
Station House Offices (SHOs) and direct
transfer of certain officers, where the
activities of an officer were prejudicial to
the welfare of a locality.
However, the law did not provide any
effective mechanism to the DM to check
police excesses. Furthermore, people were
not provided any recourse against police
misconduct. Sections 1.18, 1.10 and 1.20
required police officers and the subordinate
magistracy to cultivate friendly relations
to work as a team under the command of DM to
maintain public peace. Since the DM was head
of magistracy, and the law also envisaged
him/her as a non-uniformed commander of the
force, the spirit of law was that both wings
under his/her command should work as a
cohesive team to maintain public order.
A study of the powers and functions of DM
and magistracy clearly shows that the powers
of check and balance over the police were
not intended to provide safeguards to the
public, but sought to emphasis on the
effectiveness of the system. Whatever little
control was provided under the law eroded
with the passage of time, as it became a
priority for the DM to enjoy cordial
relations with his/her counterparts and not
upset them by employing the checks available
to him/her under the law. The DM, being head
of a district, was responsible for public
order and needed total police cooperation,
thus condoning police excesses at the cost
of the public. This indifferent and biased
conduct of the DM contributed towards the
gradual brutalization of police behavior,
which ended up as an oppressive force with
little regard to the basic rights of
citizens.
Additionally, under
Criminal Procedure Code, the DM and
subordinate magistracy were provided powers
of judicial scrutiny in cases of illegal
detentions/arrests, and of judicial
accountability in incidents of police
excesses (including custodial killings).
Unfortunately, those powers were seldom used
independently and judiciously, and actually
served to provide judicial cover to police
brutalities